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PATTERSON v. McLEAN CREDIT 
UNION: RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION BY PRIVATE 
ACTORS AND RACIAL 
HARASSMENT UNDER SECTION 
1981 
Helen J. Moore* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's narrow construction in Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union l of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,2 which derives from 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,3 reduced the protection afforded by 
section 1981 against racial discrimination, and diminished sub-
stantially the options faced by victims of racial discrimination 
for relief under federaf law. The Patterson Court held that it 
would not overrule its decision in Runyon v. McCrary' that sec-
tion 1981 prohibits private, as well as state action, which 
amounts to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement 
of contracts. Ii But it then held that the portion of section 1981 
which guarantees freedom from racial discrimination in the 
making and enforcement of contracts does not apply to racial 
• J.D., 1990, Golden Gate University School of Law; M.B.A., 1988, University of 
Louisville; B.A., 1981, Kentucky College. 
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) provides in full: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, 
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
3. Ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). 
4. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
5. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369. 
617 
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harassment which becomes manifest after contract formation. 8 
Patterson's narrow construction of discrimination in the making 
and enforcement of contracts left section 1981 virtually useless 
against racial discrimination, in spite of the affirmance of 
Runyon. 
Patterson involved allegations by a black female employee 
of a credit union that she was harassed by her employer based 
on her race. She alleged that she was harassed, subjected to abu-
sive comments, and treated differently from whites regarding 
wage increases, amount of work assignments, type of work as-
signments, promotions, and performance evaluations. The ma-
jority held that section 1981's guarantee of non-discrimination in 
the making of contracts does not apply to her facts. It held that 
the section "extends only to the formation of a contract, but not 
to problems that may arise later from the conditions of continu-
ing employment."7 
This Note argues that had the Patterson Court considered 
the evidence of congressional intent and concern in its interpre-
tation of section 1981, and had it placed more weight on policy 
considerations, it would have held that section 1981 prohibits ra-
cial harassment. The Note shows that, as decided, the Patterson 
decision will leave many victims of contractual racial harassment 
with an inadequate remedy, or with no remedy at all, because 
the closest alternative to section 1981, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,8 is much less effective than section 1981, and 
because Patterson's narrow construction of section 1981 deters 
the filing of employment discrimination claims. The result will 
be that racial harassment in the United States will be allowed to 
continue and increase.9 
6. [d. 
7. [d. at 2372. 
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
9. The similarities in the operation and effects of state treatment of race and sex 
discrimination make the Patterson result particularly important to women. "As bases for 
classification, sex and race share three important similarities: (1) by and large, members 
of the subordinate group are readily identifiable; (2) membership in the "inferior" group 
is initially nonvolitional; and (3) once acquired, this membership cannot be renounced." 
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 739 (1971). 
The effects of the two forms of discrimination are equally similar. "A general pat-
tern of economic and political disadvantage is easily demonstrable in both cases .... 
When it enforces either kind of discrimination with a broad range of sanctions, the state 
2
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II. BACKGROUND 
The legislation at issue in Patterson, the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, derives from America's Civil War and post-Civil War expe-
rience. That experience had a profound effect on the attitudes of 
federal lawmakers toward both the fight against racial inequality 
and the role of the federal government in that fight.IO The 
Union's defeat of the Confederacy in the Civil War was much 
more than a return to the status quo; the defeat of the rebellion 
and the abolition of slavery ushered in a full revolution. Politics, 
labor relations, racial relations, the social order, the economy, 
and the allocation of resources were drastically and permanently 
altered. ll One revolutionary change was the expansion of the 
powers of the federal government during the war. The federal 
(Union) government was forced during the war to take an active 
role in industry, finance, and agriculture. This led to a federal 
government with a much larger income, bureaucracy, and re-
sponsibility, and it reversed completely the prewar balance of 
power between the federal and state governments. I2 
Moreover, the Emancipation Proclamation had given this 
new, strong federal government a moral purpose - that of "cus-
todian of freedom"13 and protector of human equality and 
human rights. The Thirty-ninth Congress, which convened fol-
lowing the close of the Civil War, was disturbed by the evidence 
before it of continuing racial inequality in the South. I" Congress 
believed that it had the power to end such inequality. I II The 
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments and the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1875 are some of the Reconstruc-
tion Congress' efforts to end inequality and protect the civil 
rights of all citizens.I6 The history of the passage of these laws 
encourages its citizens to relate to each other according to group stereotypes, rather than 
as individuals." Id. at 740. Given these similarities, the state's attitudes and reactions 
toward one form of discrimination are highly likely to be the same toward the other. 
10. See Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the 
Proper Scope of Section 1981,98 YALE L.J. 541, 547-51 (1989). 
11. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. 1863-1877, at 24 
(1989). 
12. Id. at 23; Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. 
L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (1952). 
13. E. FONER, supra note 11, at 24. 
14. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 548; Gressman, supra note 12, at 1325-26. 
15. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 548. 
16. Gressman, supra note 12, at 1323-36. 
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sheds light on Congress' intent regarding them, and should be 
considered in any attempt to interpret them. 
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 
Immediately after the end of the Civil War, President 
Andrew Johnson began to implement his plan of reconstruction. 
Many of the radical members of his Republican Party wished 
that he would make black suffrage a requirement for readmis-
sion of the southern states to the union.17 Instead, Johnson's 
plan required only that the individuals who had participated in 
the rebellion pledge an oath of loyalty to the union and support 
for emancipation. In return, these individuals would receive am-
nesty, pardon, and restoration of all rights to property (except 
for slaves}.18 Only those pardoned, a group that did not include 
blacks, were to be qualified to vote.19 Johnson also appointed 
provisional governors of the southern states as part of his plan.20 
Johnson's plan was premised on his belief that the federal gov-
ernment lacked the power to impose the requirement of black 
suffrage on the states and on the belief that blacks had no role 
to play in the reconstruction of the southern states.21 
Johnson's plan called for federal involvement with the 
South's reconstruction to stop with these measures, and for the 
southern states, with their newly readmitted citizens and newly 
appointed provisional governors, to take . charge of the transition 
from slavery to freedom.22 During the rest of 1865 the southern 
states held constitutional conventions and elected legislators, 
governors, and members of Congress.28 When these elections 
were completed Johnson deemed the work of reconstructing the 
south complete.24 
Yet the course of events in the south made it apparent that 
the work of reconstruction was far from complete. The newly 
17. E. FONER, supra note 11, at 178. 
18. [d. at 183. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 183-87. 
21. [d. at 178-84. The latter belief stemmed from Johnson's own racial prejudices 
and his belief that his chances for reelection were greatest if he won the favor of the 
white southern yeomen (small farmer) and planter aristocracy classes. [d. at 191. 
22. See id. at 189. 
23. [d. at 193-96. 
24. [d. at 196. 
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reconstructed state legislatures immediately adopted Black 
Codes, which sought to confine blacks to a condition as close to 
slavery as possible, maintaining the south's pre-war social and 
economic order. 211 These laws were enforced by a police and judi-
cial system that excluded blacks entirely.28 State militia, urban 
police forces, and courts were staffed exclusively with whites.27 
Militiamen patrolled the counties and often terrorized the black 
population by abusing them and ransacking their homes.28 Fur-
thermore, lynchings and violence against blacks at the hands of 
private individuals were widespread at this time.29 
This course of events was disturbing to both the radical and 
moderate politicians in Washington. When the Thirty-ninth 
Congress convened in December of 1865, the Republican major-
ity excluded the newly elected southern congressmen and set up 
the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction in order to 
initiate its own plan of Reconstruction.30 Congress also sought to 
enact legislation effectuating the thirteenth amendment, which 
was ratified in December of 1865.31 
25. Id. at 198-99. For example, in Mississippi, postbellum Black Codes of 1865 pro-
vided the following: Negroes could rent or lease land only in incorporated cities or towns, 
"in which the corporate authorities shall control the same"; contracts for labor made 
with Negroes for a period of longer than one month must be in writing; if a Negro la-
borer should quit before the end of the contract term then he would forfeit wages earned 
before quitting; any person may arrest and carry such a Negro worker back. to his em-
ployer, and that person would receive a reward deducted from the Negro worker's wages; 
it was a criminal offense to attempt to persuade a Negro worker to leave his employer 
before the end of the contract term or to knowingly give or sell to such worker any food, 
clothing or employment; the names of all Negro children under eighteen' who were not 
supported by parents were to be reported to the probate court, and these children were 
to be apprenticed to "some competent and suitable person," preferably their former 
master; deserting apprentices were to be arrested and punished in the same manner as 
deserting Negro workers; Negroes over eighteen "with no lawful employment or business, 
or found unlawfully assembling themselves together," would be deemed vagrants; white 
persons assembling with Negroes or "usually associating" with Negroes "on terms of 
equality" were also deemed vagrants. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES. A CENTURY OF .CIVIL 
RIGHTS 13-15 (1961). 
26. E. FONER, supra note 11, at 203. 
27.Id. 
28.Id. 
29. See Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justification 
for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1026 (1972). 
30. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 43. 
31. The thirteenth amendment states: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
5
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The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an early and major work of 
the Thirty-ninth Congress toward the guarantee and protection 
of civil rights. Section one of the Act declares: 
All persons born in the United States ... are citi-
zens of the United States; and such citizens, of 
every race and color, without regard to any previ-
ous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . 
. . shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory in the United States, to make and en-
force contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, and to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by 
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ments, pains, and penalties, and to none other, 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
to the contrary notwithstanding.32 
The Act gave federal officers and the federal courts the power to 
enforce its provisions.33 
When it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Thirty-
ninth Congress had evidence before it of grave racial inequality 
in the south, including the Black Codes, discrimination by pri-
vate individuals, and onerous working conditions for blacks, and 
Congress was disturbed by such evidence.34 In addition, in pass-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 Congress was implementing its 
own plan of Reconstruction in order to bring about more radical 
changes in the southern racial order than those called for in 
Johnson's plan. Given these historical indications of congres-
sional concern, it is highly probable that Congress intended a 
broad construction of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
32. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). 
33. [d. 
34. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 551-56. 
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President Johnson vetoed the act.31i He objected to the pro-
vision which declared all native born persons citizens, including 
Gypsies, Negroes, and some American Indians. He argued that 
these people should be required to demonstrate their fitness to 
become citizens, as aliens must.36 He also argued that the bill 
exceeded the scope of the thirteenth amendment. Johnson be-
lieved that the thirteenth amendment merely abolished the 
master-slave relationship, hence that the bill provided to Con-
gress much greater power than the amendment authorized.37 
The doubts as to the constitutionality of this Act raised by 
the President and by its congressional opponents stimulated 
Congress to pass the fourteenth amendment. 38 The purpose of 
the fourteenth amendment,39 passed on June 13, 1866, was to 
make the centralization of civil rights authority in the federal 
government permanent, to assure that most of the President's 
constitutional objections to the Act would be removed, and to 
guarantee to all individuals citizenship and full protection of the 
laws.'o The fourteenth amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868. 
Congressional concern over civil rights is manifest in two 
other legacies of this era: the fifteenth amendment,oU ratified in 
March of 1870,42 and the Civil Rights Act of 1870,43 which was 
35. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 49. 
36.Id. 
37.Id. 
38. Id. at 51. 
39. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment states: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
40. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 51·56. 
41. Section 1 of the fifteenth amendment states: 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. 
U.S. CON ST. amend. XV, § 1. 
42. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 57. 
43. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. 
7
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enacted under the authority granted to Congress by the four-
teenth amendment. A primary aim of the Civil Rights Act of 
1870 was to ensure voting rights to black citizens." In addition, 
because doubts still lingered about whether the thirteenth 
amendment provided the authority to pass the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, that Act was reenacted in its entirety in section 18 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1870.411 The idea was that reenacting the 
earlier Act pursuant to the fourteenth amendment would re-
move doubts as to the constitutionality of the earlier Act. 46 Fur-
thermore, at the time the 1870 Act was proposed, discrimination 
against immigrants to the United States, especially the Chinese, 
was rampant.'7 Section 16 of the 1870 Act was enacted for the 
protection of these aliens.4s Section 16 is identical to section 1 of 
the 1866 Act, except that it uses the words "all persons" instead 
of "all citizens" in its guarantee of civil rights.'9 
44. M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 25, at 57. 
45. See Note, supra note 29, at 1030-31. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. at 1030. 
48. [d. 
49. The virtually identical language of sections 16 and 18 of the 1870 Act has caused 
a controversy over the origin of the present section 1981. The problem in tracing the 
origin of the present section 1981 was created in 1874 when all the statutes of the United 
States were consolidated and revised. Section 1981 (then section 1977) appeared in its 
present form in the 1874 revised statutes along with a codifier's historical note saying 
that it was derived from section 16 of the 1870 Act. The note did not mention section 18 
of the 1870 Act. Section 1982 also appears in its present form along with a note listing 
the 1866 Act as its source. 
If the codifiers's note to section 1977 (the present 1981) is correct, then that section 
is based solely on the fourteenth amendment, 'which applies only to state action, because 
section 16 of the 1870 Act was passed only under that amendment. However, section 18 
of the 1870 Act was passed under both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Thus 
if the codifier's note is incorrect, then section 1981 is derived from both sections 16 and 
18 of the 1870 Act, thus from both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and may 
be interpreted to reach private as well as state action. 
Proponents of the view that section 1981 derives from both sections 16 and 18 of the 
1870 Act believe that the codifier made the mistake of assuming that the rights guaran-
teed by section 18 of the 1870 Act were covered by the broader language of section 16 of 
the 1870 Act. They believe that this assumption is contrary to the intent of Congress, 
which in 1870 deliberately enacted both sections 16 and 18 because the two sections 
protected two different classes of individuals. Proponents of this belief point out that the 
codifier was not authorized to make any substantive changes in the law, and that he 
ignored a basic rule of statutory construction, which is that no two parts of the same 
document be construed as covering the same ground. 
Opponents of this view point simply to the codifier's note, which mentions only sec-
tion 16, to the similar "all persons" language in section 16 of the 1870 Act and section 
1981, and to several old Supreme Court cases which hold that section 1981 was derived 
solely from section 16. 
8
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Reconstruction was an important period in the advance-
ment of the federal government's legal protection of civil rights. 
The three Civil War constitutional amendments and the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1875110 were the results of the Re-
construction Congress' efforts to build a comprehensive civil 
rights program. During Reconstruction the balance between fed-
eral and state power was altered significantly, and the federal 
government was given broad powers through a comprehensive 
set of laws to combat racial discrimination and to protect indi-
vidual civil rights. III Whereas the first ten amendments were 
passed in order to restrict the power of the federal government, 
and reflected the new nation's fear of powerful central govern-
ments, the three Civil War amendments elevated the role of the 
federal government to that of protector of individual civil 
rights.1I2 
Justice Swayne, dissenting in the Slaughterhouse Cases,1I3 
stated that the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth 
amendments 
are a new departure, and mark an important ep-
och in the constitutional history of the country. 
They trench directly upon the power of the 
States, and deeply affect those bodies. They are, 
in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first 
eleven. 
Fairly construed these amendments may be 
said to rise to the dignity of a new Magna 
Charta.G4 
For authority supporting the view that the codifier's note is incorrect, see Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976); Note, Section 1981 and Priuate Discrimination: 
An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1037-39 
(1972); Note, Runyon u. McCrary: Section 1981 Opens the Doors of Discriminatory Pri-
uate Schools, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 179, 187-89 (1977). 
For authority supporting the view that the codifier's note is correct, see Runyon; 427 
U.S. at 195 & n.6 (White, J., dissenting); Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 
(M.D. Ala. 1971). 
50. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. 
51. See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1323. 
52. See id. 
53. 83 ·U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
54. [d. at 125 (citation omitted). 
9
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The Supreme Court would soon take most of the life out of 
many of these laws. Ii Ii Yet even today they are not completely 
gone, nor has hope vanished that they will one day be revitalized 
and used in the spirit in which they were passed - to eradicate 
inequality. 
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THESE LAWS FROM THEIR ORI-
GIN TO THE PRESENT 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not enforced by the Su-
preme Court for over 100 years, until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
CO.Ii6 and Runyon v. McCrary.Ii7 In the interim, a series of Su-
preme Court decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries declared several provisions of the Reconstruction era 
statutes unconstitutional and interpreted others extremely nar-
rowly.Ii8 The decisions had the effect of transferring back to the 
states the prime responsibility for the protection of individual 
55. See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1336-43. 
56. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
57. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
58. The first in the series of decisions was the 1873 Supreme Court decision in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Court held that a Louisiana law 
creating a monopoly in a single corporation for slaughtering animals was a valid exercise 
of the state's police power to protect the health of its citizens. Id. at 60-66. Even though 
these grounds were adequate to dispose of the case, the Supreme Court chose to rule on 
the broader constitutional argument raised by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had argued that 
the fourteenth amendment gave national citizenship primacy over state citizenship, and 
provided further that no state could abridge the privileges and immunities of national 
citizens, among which was the privilege of engaging in the lawful business of slaughtering 
animals. The Supreme Court held that the privileges and immunities clause covered only 
national citizenship, and that an individual's civil rights derived only from his state citi-
. zenship. The Court held that national citizenship included only the few rights that grew 
out of the relationship between the citizen and the national government, such as the 
right to sue in the federal courts and the right to protection on the high seas. Id. at 67-
80. 
The extremely narrow interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the 
fourteenth amendment remains valid law today. The clause has lain dormant ever since 
as a defense against the infringement of an individual's civil rights, and "for all practical 
purposes the privileges and immunities clause [has) passed into the realm of historical 
oddities." See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1338. 
The next set-back came three years later with the Supreme Court's 1875 decision in 
United States v. Cruikshank. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). The Cruikshank case involved an al-
leged violation of the conspiracy section of the 1870 act. That section prohibited two or 
more persons from conspiring "to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen, 
with intent to prevent or hinder [the) free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privi-
lege granted or secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States." Act of 
May 31, 1870, ch.114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision 
in the Slaughterhouse Cases by holding that the right involved (here the right of Ne-
groes to assemble) did not grow out of any relationship of the Negroes with the federal 
10
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civil rights, "a result which the legislators of 1866 to 1875 had 
expressly sought to prevent. "119 
government, as would, for example, the right to assemble to petition Congress for a re-
dress of grievances. Furthermore, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment applied 
only to state action, and not to action by private individuals. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554-
55. 
The hardest blow to the post-Civil War civil rights legislation and amendments 
came with the Ci~il Rights Cases of 1883, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court considered seven 
cases together. Two involved the denial of accommodations at an inn to Negroes, four 
involved the denial of accommodations at a theater or opera house to Negroes, and one 
involved the denial of access to a railroad car to a Negro. These plaintiffs sued to enforce 
a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which states that "all persons within ... the 
United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, thea-
ters, and other places of public amusement." Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch.114, § 1, 18 Stat. 
335, 336. 
The Supreme Court declared that this provision was unconstitutional. The Court 
again held that the fourteenth amendment applies only to state action, and it held that 
because this provision was directed at individual action it was not authorized by any 
provision in the Constitution. It held that persons wronged by the acts of individuals 
must look to the laws of the state for redress. Civil" Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12. 
The Supreme Court also addressed the argument that this provision is valid under 
the thirteenth amendment. The Court held that the thirteenth amendment is applicable 
to private actions and that it gives to Congress the power to outlaw all badges and inci-
dents of slavery in the United States. But the Court then interpreted "badges and inci-
dents of slavery" very narrowly. It held that the facts before it, the denial of admission 
to an inn, theater, or railroad car because of one's race, did not involve any badge or 
incident of slavery. The Court listed as incidents of slavery the disabilities to hold prop-
erty, make contracts, have standing in court, and act as a witness against white persons, 
among others. Thus it held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, passed under the thirteenth 
amendment, is constitutional, and that the rights it guarantees relate to incidents of 
slavery. Id. at 24-25. 
Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases "remains a living force in constitu-
tional law," Gressman, supra note 12 at 1341 nA8 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 105 (1947)), and "deserves a high 
place among the writings of American statesmen marking progress in the development of 
democratic thought." Id. (citing M. KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 13 
(1947)). Harlan believed that the thirteenth amendment was passed to do more than 
outlaw the master-slave relationship. He believed that it also provided former slaves 
"such civil rights as belong to freedmen of other races" and that it gave Congress the 
power to pass laws to protect former slaves against deprivation of their civil rights. Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 34-36. Harlan argued that state citizenship implies freedom 
from race discrimination that threatens civil rights enjoyed by white citizens, that the 
fourteenth amendment gave Congress the power to protect state citizenship, and that it 
did not limit the power of Congress to protect citizens only against state action. He 
believed that the fourteenth amendment applied at least to actions by the state, its of-
ficers, and individuals exercising public functions, which he believed included innkeep-
ers, common carriers, and theater owners. Id. at 44-59. 
See also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 
(1903); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 
(1876). 
59. Gressman, supra note 12, at 1342. 
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Collectively, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
decisions have been described as a counter-revolution,60 and the 
south's redemption.61 They ushered in an era, uninterrupted un-
til the civil rights movement of the 1960s, when the nation's in-
dividuals could not look to their national government for protec-
tion of "those fundamental rights which, by universal 
concession, inhere in a state of freedom,"62 and when private in-
dividuals were free to discriminate on the basis of race in many 
settings as long as their discriminatory actions could not be at-
tributable to the state.63 
The civil rights movement of the 1960s brought renewed at-
tention to the Reconstruction era civil rights laws, including the 
1866 Civil Rights Act. Beginning in the 1960s the Supreme 
Court's opinions began to reflect the view that the guarantee of 
racial equality contained in the Civil War era statutes should be 
enforced.64 
The first Supreme Court case to enforce the 1866 Act was 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.6/S In Jones, a private real estate 
company refused to sell a house to plaintiff because of his race. 
The plaintiff sued, claiming that this action violated his rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Like section 1981, section 1982 stems 
from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; thus it is often 
considered a companion to section 1981.66 It states in part that 
"(a)11 citizens of the United States shall have the same right ... 
as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." The Supreme 
Court in Jones held that section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act 
prohibits private individuals from discriminating on the basis of 
race in the sale or rental of property.67 
60. [d. at 1337. 
61. E. FONER, supra note 11, at 582. 
62. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 34. 
63. See Gressman, supra note 12, at 1336-43. Actions affirmatively authorized by 
state officials or permitted by state law are examples of actions which may be attributed 
to the state. 
64. See Note, supra note 29, at 1035. 
65. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
66. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2383 (1989). 
67. Jones, 392 U.S. at 437-44. 
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The Jones court held that the thirteenth amendment and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were both passed in order to elimi-
nate private as well as state racial discrimination.68 In its analy-
sis the Court noted that section 1982 contains very expansive 
language, and it interpreted the statutory language "the same 
right" to mean the right to treatment equal to that which whites 
receive in private property transactions.69 The Court next ana-
lyzed the legislative history of section 1 of the 1866 act, and con-
cluded that Congress had intended that this Act reach private 
discrimination.70 To support its conclusion the Court cited the 
great deal of evidence before Congress of private acts of discrim-
ination in the south against blacks. Statements made during the 
congressional debates on the bill, the Court found, showed that 
the legislators were aware .of and intended to prohibit such 
discrimination.71 
In his dissent Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority's 
interpretation of the language and legislative history of the 1866 
act. He believed that the statute's language and legislative his-
tory show that Congress intended only to grant to blacks equal 
status before the law. To support his conclusion, he relied on 
statements from the same congressional debates and by sorrie of 
the same senators that were cited by the majority.72 
Nine years after Jones, in Runyon u. McCrary,73 the Su-
preme Court was asked to use section 1981 to prohibit two pri-
vate schools from discriminating in their admissions policies on 
the basis of race. The Supreme Court held that section 1981 pro-
hibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of 
private contracts." The Runyon majority treated as settled by 
Jones, Tillman u. Wheaton-Hauen Recreation Association;7Il 
68. [d. at 422-38. 
69. [d. at 420-21. 
70. [d. at 423-24. 
71. [d. at 427-36. 
72. [d. at 452-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This is a different Justice Harlan, with a 
very different view of the scope of the Civil War era civil rights legislation, than the 
Justice Harlan who dissented in the Civil Rights Cases eighty-one years earlier. 
73. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
74. [d. at 168-75. 
75. 410 U.S. 431 (1973). In Tillman the Court held that "in light of the historical 
interrelationship between section 1981 and section 1982," there was no reason to con-
strue those sections differently in applying them to a club that denied property-linked 
membership preferences to blacks. [d. at 440. 
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and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,76 that section 1981 ap-
plies to private acts of discrimination in the making and en-
forcement of contracts.77 
Justice White's dissent, however, argued that Congress only 
intended the Act to apply to discriminatory state action. Like 
Justice Harlan in his Jones dissent, White cited statements 
made during the congressional debates and the language of the 
statute to support his argument.7S 
III. THE PATTERSON DECISION 
A. F ACTS OF THE CASE 
Brenda Patterson was hired as a teller and file clerk at the 
McLean Credit Union in May 1972.79 She was interviewed for 
the job by Robert Stevenson, then the general manager and 
later president of the credit union. During the interview Mr. 
Stevenson warned her that all her co-workers would be white 
women and that they would not like working with a black.so 
During the ten years that Ms. Patterson worked at the 
credit union, Mr. Stevenson and other supervisors subjected Ms. 
Patterson to various forms of racial harassment. Mr. Stevenson 
told her several times that "blacks are known to work slower 
than whites by nature," and he suggested numerous times that a 
76. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Johnson the Court stated in dicta that section 1981 ap-
plied to discrimination in the making and enforcing of private contracts. [d. at 459-60. 
77. The majority did discuss, however, the issue of the origin of section 1981. See 
supra note 49. The majority held that section 1981 derives from both section 1 of the 
1866 Act (as reenacted into section 18 of the 1870 Act) and section 16 of the 1870 Act, 
thus that section 1981 derives from both the thirteenth and the fourteenth amendments. 
The Court stated that the codifier's note was either inadvertent or an error, and pointed 
out that the 1874 codifiers had authority only to "revise, simplify, arrange, and consoli-
date" existing laws. The majority in Runyon declined "to attribute to Congress an intent 
to repeal a major piece of Reconstruction legislation on the basis of an unexplained omis-
sion from the codifier's marginal notes." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8. 
Justice White's dissent, however, argued that section 1981 is derived solely from 
section 16 of the 1870 Act, and thus has roots only in the fourteenth amendment and 
may not be interpreted to reach private discrimination. The dissent based its conclusion 
on the identical "all persons" language of section 1981 and section 16 of the 1870 Act 
and the "unambiguous" codifier's note. [d. at 205-06 (White, J., dissenting). 
78. [d. at 195-205 (White, J., dissenting), 
79. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363. 2368 (1989). 
80. [d. at 2392. 
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white would be able to do a better job than Ms. Patterson.81 Pe-
riodically Mr. Stevenson would stare at Ms. Patterson for sev-
eral minutes at a time; he never did this to white employees.82 
Ms. Patterson also received disparate treatment in the 
amount and type of work she was assigned. Mr. Stevenson and 
the other supervisors assigned Ms. Patterson more tasks than 
they assigned to her co-workers and when she complained about 
this she received no help. Instead she was assigned more work 
and told that she always had the option of quitting.83 In addi-
tion, Ms. Patterson was assigned tasks that white employees 
were not assigned, including dusting and sweeping.84 Ms. 
Patterson was also the only clerical worker whose work was not 
reassigned to others during a vacation; instead it was allowed to 
accumulate. 811 In addition, blacks at the credit union received 
different treatment regarding performance evaluations. At staff 
meetings Mr. Stevenson criticized Ms. Patterson and the only 
other black employee individually by name, but he would only 
discuss the performance of the other employees anonymously or 
in general terms.86 
Ms. Patterson was singled out for different treatment re-
garding advancement at the credit union. She was never offered 
training for higher level jobs even though white employees on 
her level were offered such training. She was never promoted or 
informed of any job openings even though whites were often 
hired for more senior positions.87 During Ms. Patterson's tenure, 
one white employee with less seniority than she received train-
ing and a promotion.88 
Finally, Ms. Patterson's treatment regarding wage increases 
was different from that of white employees. Although white em-
ployees received automatic pay increases after their first six 
months, Ms. Patterson was denied such a pay increase.89 
81. Id. 
82.Id. 
83.Id. 
84.Id. 
85.Id. 
86.Id. 
87.Id. 
88.Id. 
89.Id. 
15
Moore: Patterson v. McLean
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990
632 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:617 
Ms. Patterson was laid off in July 1982. Shortly thereafter 
she filed this action in federal district court. She alleged that the 
credit union had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by harassing her, fail-
ing to promote her, and discharging her because of her race.90 
The district court held that section 1981 does not apply to racial 
harassment, thus this claim was not submitted to the jury.91 
Ms. Patterson appealed the district court's holding that sec-
tion 1981 does not apply to racial harassment. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that racial harassment is not 
actionable under section 1981 because such harassment does not 
abridge the right to make and enforce contracts. The court fur-
ther held that such harassment may, however, be probative of 
discriminatory intent in the making and enforcing of contracts.92 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to'de-
cide the issue whether section 1981 applies to racial harass-
ment.93 After oral argument, the Court on its own initiative re-
quested the parties to brief and argue the additional issue of 
whether the Court's decision in Runyon v. McCrary, that section 
1981 applies to discriminatory actions by private entities, should 
be reconsidered.94 
B. THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS 
1. The Runyon Decision 
The majority first addressed the question whether Runyon 
should be overturned. The Court concluded that Runyon should 
not be overturned, and reaffirmed that section 1981 prohibits ra-
cial discrimination in the making and enforcement. of private 
contracts. 
The majority reached this conclusion without ever address-
ing whether Runyon was correctly decided in light of section 
1981's history and language. Instead, the majority based its deci-
sion entirely on the principal of stare decisis. It concluded that 
90. Id. at 2369. 
91. I d. at 2363. 
92. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1986). 
93. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 484 U.S. 814 (1987). 
94. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988). 
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none of the reasons that have been used in the past to overrule 
prior decisions construing statutes was shown in this case.911 
Finding no reasons to adequately justify overruling Runyon 
and finding that Runyon is consistent with society's commit-
ment to the eradication of racial discrimination, the Court "de-
cline[d] to overrule Runyon and acknowledge[d] that its holding 
remains the governing law in this area. "96 
2. Racial Harassment 
Next the majority considered whether section 1981 prohib-
its racial harassment such as that to which Ms. Patterson was 
subjected. The majority held that it does not. The majority be-
gan its analysis by noting the language of section 1981 and em-
phasizing that section 1981 prohibits discri~ination only in the 
"making" and "enforcement" of contracts. The majority then 
held that the language" 'the same right to ... make ... con-
tracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens' " applies "only to the 
formation of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later 
95. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370-72 (1989). Specifically 
the Court listed three reasons for which it has overruled decisions which interpret stat-
utes, and held that none of these provide adequate justification for overruling Runyon. 
The first reason explored by the Court was "the intervening development of the law, 
through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress." The 
Court stated that "where such changes have removed or weakened the conceptual under-
pinnings from the prior decision, ... or where the later law has rendered the decision 
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies, the Court has not hesitated to 
overrule an earlier decision." The Court concluded that no subsequent changes or devel-
opments in the law have undermined the Runyon decision. 
The next reason explored by the Court for overruling precedent was that a prece-
dent may be a detriment to coherence and consistency in the law, either because the 
decision is unworkable or because the decision frustrates objectives embodied in other 
laws. The Court then held that Runyon is not unworkable and does not frustrate the 
objectives of any other laws. 
Lastly, the Court stated that statutory precedents have been overruled in the past if, 
after being tested by experience, they have been found inconsistent with this country's 
sense of justice or social welfare. The Court concluded that this consideration does not 
support overruling Runyon. The court stated: 
[d. at 2371. 
Whether Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 as prohibit-
ing racial discrimination is right or wrong as an initial matter, 
it is certain that it is not inconsistent with the prevailing sense 
of justice in this country. To the contrary, Runyon is entirely 
consistent with our society's deep commitment to the eradica-
tion of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of 
his or her skin. 
96. [d. at 2372. 
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from the conditions of continuing employment. "97 The opinion 
explained that a racially motivated refusal to enter into a con-
tract, or an offer to make a contract only on racially discrimina-
tory terms, is prohibited by this language, whereas "conduct by 
the employer after the contract relation has been established, in-
cluding ... imposition of discriminatory working conditions," is 
not prohibited by this language.98 
Next the opinion interpreted the section 1981 language 
" 'the same right ... to ... enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.' " The majority concluded that the language re-
fers merely to protection of legal process and of a right of access 
to legal process.99 Efforts to impede access to the courts or ob-
struct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes were cited 
as examples of prohibited conduct. The majority concluded that 
"the right to enforce contracts does not, however, extend beyond 
conduct by an employer which impairs an employee's ability to 
enforce through legal process his or her established contract 
rights. 11100 
The opinion then applied to Ms. Patterson's case the lan-
guage it had so narrowly interpreted, and not surprisingly held 
that the interpretation does not encompass her facts. The major-
ity stated that none of the conduct to which Ms. Patterson was 
subjected involves the refusal to enter into a contract or the im-
pairment of her access to the legal process to enforce her con-
tract.101 • The conduct was rather "post-formation conduct by the 
employer relating to the terms and conditions of continuing 
employment. "102 
In support of its holding, the majority stated that since Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does prohibit the conduct 
to which Ms. Patterson was subjected, "interpreting section 1981 
to cover [such conduct] ... would ... undermine the detailed 
97. [d. 
98. [d. at 2373. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. at 2374. 
102. [d. 
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and well-crafted procedures for conciliation and resolution of Ti-
tle VII claims."los The majority stated that it was "reluctant ... 
to read an earlier statute broadly where the result is to circum-
vent the detailed· remedial scheme constructed in a later 
statute. "I 04 
C. BRENNAN'S ANALYSIS 
Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall 
and Blackmun, concurred with the majority in its conclusion 
that Runyon should be reaffirmed, but he based this conclusion 
on "two very obvious reasons for refusing to overrule this inter-
pretation of section 1981: that Runyon yvas correctly decided, 
and that in any event Congress has ratified our construction of 
the statute. "1011 These justices also dissented from the majority's 
holding that section 1981 does not encompass Ms. Patterson's 
racial harassment claim. lOS 
1. The Runyon Decision 
In his conclusion that Runyon should be reaffirmed, 
Brennan first argued that Runyon was correctly decided. l07 He 
stated that the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1981 
has been "based upon a full and considered review of the stat-
ute's language and legislative history."108 He cited in detail and 
with approval the analysis in Jones u. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 
which interpreted the "same right" language of section 1982 and 
the legislative history of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. Brennan's opinion endorsed the Jones Court's finding that 
in 1866 there was" 'an imposing body of evidence [before Con-
gress] pointing to the mistreatment of Negroes by private indi-
viduals and unofficial groups, mistreatment unrelated to any 
hostile state legislation.' "l09 Brennan also emphasized Jones' in-
terpretation of the congressional debates on the 1866 Act and 
103. [d. 
104. [d. at 2375. 
105. [d. at 2380 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
106. [d. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. at 2382 (Bre~nan, J., dissenting). 
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the earlier Freedman's Bureau bill as showing that these bills 
were intended to reach private discrimination. no 
Lastly, Brennan pointed out that since the Jones and 
Runyon decisions, no new information had come before the 
Court as to the origin of section 1981, or as to the legislative 
history of the 1866 act. He concluded that the careful analysis in 
Jones and Runyon is persuasive.ll1 
Brennan's second reason for refusing to overrule Runyon 
was that Congress has ratified the Supreme Court's construction 
of section 1981. Congress ratified Runyon, Brennan argued, 
when it considered and rejected an amendment to Title VII that 
would have made section 1981 unavailable as a remedy in most 
cases of private employment discrimination, and also when Con-
gress enacted a statute that provides for the recovery of attorney 
fees in section 1981 actions.1l2 
The amendment to Title VII to which Brennan was refer-
ring is the amendment proposed by Senator Hruska in 1972 that 
would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for private acts 
of employment discrimination. Brennan pointed out that Sena-
tor Hruska stated in support of this amendment that he be-
lieved that both section 1981 and Title VII applied to private 
discrimination, and that his amendment would eliminate this 
overlap. Brennan explained that the amendment failed to win 
passage, and later it failed to be reconsidered. Brennan con-
cluded, citing Runyon, that this is a clear indication that Con-
gress agrees that section 1981 does reach private acts of racial 
discrimination.ll3 
Brennan also argued that Congress' action in passing the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, which permits 
110. [d. at 2382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan also endorsed the conclusion 
of the Runyon majority that section 1981 is derived from both section 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. He reiterated that the 
1874 revisors had only limited authority, and that probably the revisor's note printed 
alongside section 1977 of the 1874 revisions (the present section 1981) was inadvertent or 
an error. See supra notes 49 & 77. 
111. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2384 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
112. [d. at 2385-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
113. [d. at 2386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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the recovery of attorney fees in section 1981 actions, "goes be-
yond mere acquiescence in [the Supreme Court's] interpretation 
of section 1981,"114 and shows congressional ratification of the 
Supreme Court's construction of section 1981. 
2. Racial Harassment 
Brennan's opinion also dissented from the majority's hold-
ing that section 1981 does not encompass racial harassment 
which becomes manifest after contract formation. He argued 
that the legislative history of section 1981 shows, through the 
debates and evidence before Congress, not only that Congress 
intended that the Acts from which section 1981 is derived reach 
private discrimination, but also that those Acts were "designed 
to protect the freedmen from the imposition of working condi-
tions that evidence an intent on the part of the employer to con-
tract on discriminatory terms."lUI 
Brennan next argued that the language of section 1981 is 
"naturally read as extending to cover post-forma~ion conduct 
that demonstrates that the contract was not really made on 
equal terms at all."116 Brennan interpreted the language "the 
same right ... to make ... contracts ... as is enjoyed 'by white 
citizens" as covering harassment if the harassment is so severe 
or pervasive as to demonstrate that the employer has in fact 
"made" a contract which includes discriminatory terms.1l7 
Lastly, Brennan addressed the majority's argument that 
since Title VII covers Ms. Patterson's claims, section 1981 need 
not be construed to do so. He pointed out that Congress rejected 
an amendment to Title VII that would make it the exclusive 
remedy for these claims, thus that Congress envisioned Title VII 
and section 1981 as alternative remedies.1l8 He also argued that 
the existence of Title VII adds nothing to the question of how to 
interpret section 1981, which was written almost 100 years 
before Title VII and is broader in scope than Title VII.1l9 He 
pointed out that section 1981 applies to all contracts, not just to 
114. [d. at 2387-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
115. [d. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
116. [d. at 2388-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
117. [d. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
118. [d. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
119. [d. 
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employment contracts, and that section 1981 differs from Title 
VII in available remedies, applicable statute of limitations, the 
right to a jury trial, the attorney fees recoverable, and the pre-
requisites to filing an action.120 
D. STEVENS' ANALYSIS 
Justice Stevens concurred in the majority's holding that 
Runyon should not be overruled. He also joined the portion of 
Brennan's dissent that interpreted section 1981 as covering har-
assment when the harassment is so severe as to demonstrate 
that a contract was "made" on discriminatory terms. He argued, 
as did Brennan, that there is no real difference between a situa-
tion in which an employer reveals his or her intent to impose 
discriminatory contract terms before contract formation and a 
situation in which such intent is not revealed until after contract 
formation, through intentional harassment and insult. 121 
Stevens elaborated by arguing that even when an employer 
does not form the intent to racially harass employees until after 
contract formation, the employer is still guilty of discrimination 
in the "making" of a contract. Stevens argued that this is so be-
cause a contract, rather than being a static "piece of paper," is 
evidence of an ongoing relationship between humans, and that 
humans constantly remake their contracts when duties or expec-
tations change.122 Therefore, an employer who imposes a policy 
of harassment on a contract has "remade" the contract on dis-
criminatory terms, and has violated section 1981.123 Stevens sup-
ported his argument by stating that he believes that Runyon 
would have been decided the same way had the schools allowed 
the black students to attend, but subjected them to segregated 
classes and other racial abuse. l24 
IV. CRITIQUE 
The Patterson majority refused to overrule Runyon v. 
McCrary, and stated that it had not retreated "one inch" from 
120. [d. at 2390-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
121. [d. at 2395-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
124: [d. 
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the national policy to forbid intentional racial discrimination.12lI 
But Patterson's narrow construction of discrimination in the 
making of a contract left section 1981 virtually useless against 
racial discrimination. Notwithstanding the affirmance of Run-
yon, private actors are much freer to discriminate on the basis of 
race after Patterson than before. 
The Patterson majority's approach to the interpretation 
and application of section 1981 was flawed and led to an incor-
rect interpretation for several reasons. First, the decision, in a 
noticeable break from precedent, failed to consider clear evi-
dence of the Thirty-ninth Congress' intent regarding the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. Second, the opinion instead relied on an 
overly restrictive interpretation of the language of the statute. 
Third, the opinion relied on an overlap between section 1981 
and the less effective Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
disregarding evidence of congressional intent that the two stat-
utes be alternative remedies. Lastly, the Patterson majority 
failed to consider strong public policy in its analysis. 
Neither the majority's decision to uphold Runyon, nor the 
decision that section 1981 does not apply to racial harassment 
surfacing after contract formation, considered the history of the 
enactment of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The majority opinion 
ignored evidence of Congress' concerns over unfair and unequal 
treatment of blacks at that time and the spirit in which the Act 
originated. The failure to consider the legislative history and ev-
idence of congressional intent regarding section 1981 was a ma-
jor flaw in the opinion. Had congressional intent been consid-
ered, the Court would have held that section 1981 encompasses 
racial harassment. 
As Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the legislative his-
tory of section 1981 clearly indicated that the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress intended to go beyond mere refusals to contract, and in-
tended to protect blacks from discriminatory working 
conditions. Brennan argued that Congress considered an 1865 
report when it passed the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The report, by 
Major General Carl Schurz, described post-contractual working 
conditions of blacks in the South. The conditions included use 
125. Id. at 2379. 
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of the whip and the practice of handing out severe and unequal 
punishment. Brennan concluded that this evidence showed that 
Congress intended the language "the same right ... to make and 
enforce contracts" to encompass post-contractual conduct. l26 
In addition, when taken as a whole, the history of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress leads to the conclusion that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 must be broadly construed. The Thirty-ninth 
Congress was disturbed by the weakness and inefficacy of 
Johnson's Reconstruction plan and by the grave racial inequality 
in the south.l27 It implemented its own plan in order to bring 
about more radical changes in the southern racial order. The 
dedication of the Thirty-ninth Congress to the implementation 
of a social order radically removed from the previous one and 
the great deal of evidence before it of the Black Codes, injustice 
at the hands of private individuals, and onerous working condi-
tions, lead to the conclusion that Congress intended a broad 
construction of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 
Lastly, the majority's failure to consider congressional in-
tent was a noticeable and questionable departure from its previ-
ous analyses of the 1866 Act. The Jones, Runyon, Tillman, and 
other126 opinions all relied on the legislative history of the Act 
and all concluded that the history called for a broad interpreta-
tion. Patterson's refusal to do so was a questionable break from 
precedent. 
Patterson's restrictive interpretation of the language of sec-
tion 1981 was a second major flaw in its analysis. In arriving at 
the holding that section 1981 does not encompass racial harass-
ment, the majority interpreted the language of the statute as if 
the words were in a vacuum. Its effort to define "make a con-
tract" as merely the mechanical entry into the contractual rela-
tionship, and its effort to distinguish an offer to make a contract 
on discriminatory terms from a contract that in fact contains 
discriminatory terms once formed, was forced. The majority 
drew an artificial line at the moment an enforceable contract is 
recognized, and chose to ignore the manner in which contracts 
126. [d. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
127. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 548'49. 
128. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); McDonald 
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287-95 (1976). 
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containing discriminatory terms are formed in reality. Rarely 
will a party who intends to contract on discriminatory terms dis-
close this intent up front. 
Any contract "made" with discriminatory terms is prohib-
ited by section 1981, not merely those contracts in which the 
discriminatory party manifests this intent before the contract is 
formed. The question whether a contract is "made" with dis-
criminatory terms should be one of fact for the jury. The major-
ity's decision deprived Ms. Patterson, and all those who follow 
her, of this right. 
The majority's attempt to support its interpretation of sec-
tion 1981 by pointing out that Ms. Patterson's particular set of 
facts is actionable under another statute was a third flaw in the 
Court's analysis. The existence of one law should play no part in 
the interpretation of another, unless the existence of one is pro-
bative of Congress' intent regarding the other. Congress enacted 
section 1981 almost one hundred years before it enacted Title 
VII; Title VII sheds no light on congressional intent regarding 
section 1981. Furthermore, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his 
dissent, there is strong evidence that Congress intends section 
1981 and Title VII to be alternative remedies. 129 The evidence is 
that Congress recently considered and rejected an amendment 
to Title VII that would have made it the exclusive remedy for 
private employment discrimination. ISO 
The Court's failure to consider any public policy in its har-
assment analysis was another flaw in the majority decision. 
When congressional intent is not considered, as in Patterson's 
harassment analysis, it seems reasonable that a statute should 
be interpreted by weighing conceivable congressional intentions 
with policy considerations. There has been a strong public policy 
in the United States since the Civil War in favor of the eradica-
tion of racial discrimination and inequality. The Patterson ma-
jority's failure to consider both this policy and congressional in-
tent in its harassment holding is regrettable. 
129. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
130. [d. at 2385-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Fortunately, the majority did consider contemporary poli-
cies in the face of arguably non-discernible congressional intent 
when it upheld Runyon. The majority pointed out that there is a 
strong argument for the view that section 1981 does not reach 
private conduct as well as for the view that it does. The majority 
then held that "Runyon is entirely consistent with our society's 
deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on 
a person's race or the color of his or her skin,"13l and upheld the 
decision. 
As the Patterson majority pointed out, some victims of har-
assment in employment contracts may sue under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.132 A recent study found that ap-
proximately seventy-seven percent of section 1981 claims were 
employment claims, and as such were covered by Title VII.133 
However, Title VII often provides inadequate coverage for 
claims of racial harassment in employment relations.13" 
First, Title VII requires several procedural prerequisites to 
the filing of an action which section 1981 does not require. Title 
VII requires that remedies with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) be exhausted before a suit may be 
filed in federal court, and it also requires that suits must be filed 
within ninety days of the EEOC's decision whether to sue. Sec-
tion 1981 has no requirement that a complaint first be filed with 
the EEOC, and it has a more relaxed statute of limitations. 
Second, Title VII is much more restrictive in the remedies it 
allows. Punitive damages are not allowed under Title VII, and 
back pay is limited to two years. Section 1981 contains neither 
of these limitations. 1311 
Third, no jury trials are allowed under Title VII claims, 
whereas section 1981 claims may be tried before a jury.136 
131. Id. at 2371. 
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17(1982). 
133. Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, CORNELL L. REV. 596, 
601 (1988). These authors studied every section 1981 case filed in three federal districts 
in the fiscal year 1980 to 1981 .. Id. at 598. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 602 n.38. 
136. Id. 
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Fourth, Title VII does not apply to employers of fewer than 
fifteen employees. The result is that 86.3 % of all employers and 
14.4% of all employees are exempt from Title VII claims.137 Un-
like Title VII, section 1981 has no such minimum employer size 
requirement. ISB 
Lastly, contracts other than employment are not covered by 
Title VII. Thus victims of harassment in contracts involving 
schools, banking services, recreational facilities, medical facili-
ties, and independent services, among many others, have no 
remedy comparable to section 1981, and will be left with a re-
duced chance of recovery or no chance at all. ls9 
The immediate effect of Patterson's narrow interpretation 
of section 1981 is to remove that law as a remedy for most 
claims of racial harassment in contractual relations. A November 
1989 study conducted by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund found 
that in the four and one half months following the Patterson 
decision, at least ninety-six racial discrimination claims were 
dismissed under Patterson by federal judges.140 The cases dis-
missed involved charges of racially discriminatory discharge, 
harassment, promotion, and retaliation. Plaintiffs in the dis-
missed cases represented six different races. w The study 
pointed out that a significant number of the dismissed claims 
were not actionable under or could not be remedied under Title 
VII for various reasons.142 The study concluded that Patterson 
has had a deterrent effect on attorneys asked to repres~nt or al-
ready representing civil rights plaintiffs, because the probability 
of success has fallen too low and the possibility of Rule 11 sanc-
tions for bringing the claims has risen too high. HS Because of the 
reduced likelihood that employers will be held accountable for 
racially discriminatory conduct, the study concluded, employers 
137. Id. at 602. 
138. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
139. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 133, at 603-04. 
140. Analysis by NAACP Legal Defense Fund on Impact of Supreme Court's Deci-
sion in Patterson u. McLean Credit Union, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 223, at D-1 
(Nov. 21, 1989). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions 
against attorneys who sign pleadings which are frivolous or intended to cause delay. 
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may alter their conduct toward increased racial 
discrimination.144 
Patterson is more than a significant deterrent to the eradi-
cation of racial discrimination in this country. Together with 
several other civil rights decisions of the present Supreme Court, 
it signals what may be the beginning of a period of judicial prun-
ing of civil rights legislation similar to that of the late nine-
teenth century. Among the more notorious of Patterson's con-
temporaries are Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,1411 City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO./46 and Martin v. Wilks. 147 
Wards Cove Packing Co. held that minority civil rights 
plaintiffs may not prove employment discrimination using sta-
tistics on the adverse impact of an employer's hiring and promo-
tion practices. Martin v. Wilks held that non-parties to a con-
sent decree may challenge the plan on grounds of reverse 
discrimination after it has been approved by a court. 
City of Richmond ruled that a city's plan requiring prime . 
contractors who have been awarded city construction contracts 
to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of 
each contract to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises" 
violated the fourteenth amendment's' equal protection clause. 
The Supreme Court held that the city failed to prove a compel-
ling govenmental interest in remedying past racial discrimina-
tion. In order to prove discrimination through the use of statisti-
cal disparitites, a city must compare the number of existing and 
already qualifying Minority Business Enterprises with the dol-
lars awarded to such businesses; the disparity between the city's 
minority population and dollars awarded to minority businesses 
is not to be considered. 
Collectively, these cases and Patterson seem comparable to 
the decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, when the Supreme Court effectively took the life out of 
many Civil War era civil rights laws. 
144, Id. 
145. 110 S. Ct. 38 (1989). 
146, 488 V,S. 469 (1989), 
147. 110 S. Ct. 11 (1989). 
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Lastly, Patterson has had the effect of shifting the fight for 
the eradication of racial discrimination and harassment to Con-
gress and to state legislatures. It is toward these bodies that we 
must look and direct our efforts for progress in the near future. 
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